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Abstract
A general tension in contemporary aesthetics can be described
as existing between objective truth claims and historical
relativity. The former is generally represented by the
Enlightenment approaches and its descendants that ground
aesthetic judgment in rationality. The latter characterizes the
postmodern appeal to historicity and the exposure of historical
prejudice. Following mostly the hermeneutical philosophy of
Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Dupré, this paper argues
how aesthetic theory, defined by either pole, inadequately
accounts for historicity. In response to this critique, this paper
attempts to navigate between these two poles in returning to
an analysis of the nature of history and its phenomenological
and ontological significance. It is in the very depth of the
historical experience that aesthetics gains its greatest
fecundity by means of its commitment to meaning and
communication within history.
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1. Introduction
"If history is the disclosure of Being, then truth is present at
each stage-never completed but always in movement."[1]
The challenge tacitly confronting any aesthetic theory of
interpretation is how to account for our historical situatedness.
It is precisely here that atemporal methodologies, e.g.
structuralism or Kantian aesthetics, must respond to the
question of historical understanding that affects all
philosophical claims. Paul Ricoeur refers to this problem as an
uneasiness where the regulative idea of truth runs counter to
our sense of existential situatedness but also paradoxically
draws us ahead into a sense of unity: "The idea of truth gives
us an uneasy feeling within our historical condition-makes it
seem disturbing and deceptive while making us long for a
fullness of knowledge in the unity of immutability."[2] Ricoeur
speaks of this as the aporia of history, a term I shall be
borrowing. In general, it is this conflict between historicity and
objective truth claims that characterizes the postmodern
reaction in aesthetic theory.[3] Historical understanding is not
so much described by a 'participation in' as by a 'subjugation
to' history itself. When historicity is ignored or remains
unchallenged, the subjugation becomes a defeating one where
historical understanding is constituted by a vicious circle from
which we cannot escape. Marjorie Grene observes that if
understanding the past-aesthetically, historically or
philosophically-attempts to disclose an understanding about
the artifact of the past itself, then all diachronic interpretation
is subjugated to historical causation whose causes are
themselves covered over by more elusive historical events-
"historicity destroys itself."[4]
This points to a curious paradox of philosophy that we shall
consider below: Philosophy may account for historicity but it
does so only by means of a rational, atemporal discourse on it.
If this is true, aesthetic interpretation of art and texts, or what
is often referred to as an 'aesthetics of receptivity,' is but
another victim that must eventually succumb to historical
reduction. In regard to the epistemology of postmodernism,
how can postmodernism escape from this, even it accepts
historicity as the determining factor of aesthetic
understanding? The answer is that postmodernism generally
refers the explanation of the historical aporia to some other
reason. Thus while postmodernism sees itself as coming to
grips with historicity, at least in its conscious acknowledgment
of historical contexture, it is arguable from an epistemological
point of view about whether or not it really has in fact taken it
fully on board.
In this essay I argue that the radical determinism attributed to
historicity arises when we fail to regard temporality beyond a
linear progression, a sequence of "nows," or what Heidegger
refers to as "vulgar time."[5] My argument does not ally itself
to either an objective or postmodern position but attempts to
navigate between the two. I propose in response to the
objective drive of aesthetics that the key to releasing
ourselves from the constraints of a radical historicism does not
lie in finding and securing a methodology for aesthetics that
can stand outside the historical aporia. It lies rather in turning
away from the epistemology drawn up according to objectivity
and objective criteria which belongs to the natural and
physical sciences. While this seems to be a simple reiteration
of postmodern attacks against Enlightenment philosophy, it
can be argued that the Enlightenment preoccupation with
objectivity still holds sway over our common understanding
insofar as we tend to think of interpretation as getting at the
meaning of something that we can secure above and beyond
the artifact. In this way, the meaning interpreted means more
than the artifact itself. This securing is what Susan Sontag
repudiates, observing that it leads to a theory of art that
attempts to create a methodology for securing and entrapping
meaning more broadly.[6] Both the artifact and the interpreter
become imprisoned by a philosophical exigency to find
meaning. The sense of searching is by no means a neutral one
but is, on the contrary, through its application of methodology,
a rather violent imposition of philosophical and existential
prejudice. It is here, in this way, that the will to interpret
stems from a false conception of the self (i.e. as transparent).
On the other hand, the tendency of postmodernism, which is
often seen to be nihilistic, is to suspend any meaningful
affirmation beyond individual desire and concern.[7] Thus, by
its epistemological nature, postmodernism denies the natural
human inclination towards unity. To be sure, it would deny this
inclination as being an illusion based on the fact that such
knowledge, vis-à-vis the Enlightenment, is impossible and
does not account for historical specificity, let alone individual
free will. But this claim is really an epistemological expectation
that in itself predetermines the possibility of human
understanding. It is impossible not to think of unity insofar as
it is unity that allows distinction and difference to emerge.[8]
But this does not mean that an understanding of unity is
transparent or readily graspable. Indeed, as Heidegger would
say, it is what provokes thought and therefore rightly
constitutes the continuous path of thinking.[9]
In response to postmodernism, I argue that its reliance on
historicity as a critique is in the end displaced by a reliance on
social, psychological and cultural factors that influence
historical epochs. Thus in postmodernism history is no longer
the operating locus of human understanding. Rather, the
postmodern sleight is to rely on an interpretive foundation that
makes sense of historicity. Therefore, there are causes to a
historical disposition: desire, power, embodiment, cultural
values or any other factors that render the self more opaque
to reason.[10] While in one sense these factors indeed make
up the texture of human existence, they ignore the potency of
the historical aporia that postmodernism first appealed to by
refuting Enlightenment claims to truth and reason. Indeed, it
would seem that a taxonomy of desires or a geography of
cultural background is only another methodology used to
make sense of history in the same way that such philosophies
as Kant's Critique of Judgment attempts to make empirical
judgments universally valid.[11] If this is true, any mapping of
an aesthetics of receptivity can be subjected to the same
historical aporia that postmodernism first raised. In other
words, is not our making sense of the historical background of
desire and cultural milieu itself a construct of our historical
preoccupations and prejudices? The vicious circle emerges
once more that Grene refers to as "intellectual suicide."[12]
What, then, is a possible resolution? My thesis concerns a
return to the depth of historical experience itself. I propose
that freedom from historical defeat lies in aggravating the
historical problem in a way that makes it the point of
reflection at which the interpreter remains or is reminded of
his/her fragile relationship to the flow of history. The point is
not to resolve the historical aporia but to understand its
hermeneutical demand. I shall follow the basic theses
presented by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur[13] that
show interpretive prejudice to be a sign of our openness to
understanding itself and, therefore, to other historical epochs,
rather than a limitation or constraint placed upon our
understanding.. While this openness in no way guarantees the
success or accuracy of any interpretation, it does suggest that
the legitimacy of any interpretative act is not in its being
correct but in its ability first to recognize its situation within
history and therefore, then, to be able to account for its
specific historical presuppositions and assumptions. It ishere
that the interpretative commitment to meaningfulness can
finally be freed up and understood, not as an axiom or
possession of meaning and truth, but as a wager or hope to
disclose something that stands as an open interpretation of
the past, in order to widen a self-understanding of the
present.
2. The General and Objective Appeal of Aesthetics
In this section we shall consider the main impetus of aesthetic
theory, as it was inherited from Enlightenment philosophy, to
apprehend the art object as a mode of truth.[14] Despite the
varied theories involved in aesthetics, the current and general
view that sees the validity of aesthetics in relation to
objectivity and truth-whether psychologically, rationally or
structurally grounded-is characterized by an atemporal nature.
While sweeping in its application, the force of this argument is
directed at the philosophical presuppositions involved in the
general methodology of contemporary aesthetics. As such, it is
not meant to discredit any one theory but to exaggerate
thegeneral understanding that holds sway in our present age
despite what may be said or shown to the contrary. I assume
that by exaggerating and in fact caricaturizing the situation,
we can better see the obstacles at play.
Having said this, the general account of aesthetic theory
implies that aesthetic analyses and justifications for the
perception of beauty find their legitimacy as theories if they
appeal to a common ground of objectivity. In appealing to a
universalized perception of beauty, aesthetics is as much a
theory of the real as it is a theory of beauty and so it shares
with modern science the notion of finding a common structure
or pattern by which human subjects can judge their experience
of beauty. Otherwise, an aesthetic theory becomes merely one
opinion among others and the significance of beauty recedes
into relativism. The interesting paradox in aesthetics is that
even if it attempts to secure and legitimize the subjective
nature of sense perception, it must do so by rational means
that stake their claim on how objective their argument is.[15]
How is this relation at all possible? That is to say, how can a
non-rational experience and a rational mode of explanation
coincide? The answer is only if there lies a common ground of
experience between the two fields. Baumgarten therefore
refers to the rational and aesthetic judgment as being
"analogous."[16] This view generally reflects the rationalist
center in Enlightenment thinking that sees reason as
constituting the basis of all knowledge. It is an assumption
about reason that is not only inherent in the Enlightenment
attitude but the modern one as well. If this were not the case,
why should we seek to explain or understand the process of
sense perception and aesthetic judgment? This assumption is
so true that we find scientific terminology entering into the
discourse to explain non-scientific understanding.[17]
As we can see, the critique of historicism confronts the claim
to objectivity head on. John Millbank, though not allying
himself to postmodernism and historical radicalism,
summarizes this critique aptly in reference to an analysis of
Kant: "Prior to any theoretical grasp of objectivity, and as the
pre-condition for it, the aesthetic judgment isolates a discrete
object snatched from the continuum of time, and thereby
actually occludes-as Kant astonishingly admits-the reality of
this flux."[18]
Perhaps the most striking and ironic case in point is the
historical foundation of objective methodologies. Here it is the
inheritance of the Enlightenment metaphysics that informs the
birth of aesthetics. This inheritance is itself something that
arises out of a specific and unique historical relationship. In
this case, the Enlightenment philosophical attitude is one that
believed it stood imperialistically at the forefront of the history
of philosophy and could somehow rise above its predecessors.
Thus the preoccupation with objectivity is itself a product of a
non-objective phenomenon, i.e. history, the Enlightenment
discourse.[19] After all, there is no omniscient view of history,
even in hindsight. The risk of avoiding this historical relation
and precedent in a responsible reflection means, to some
extent, to be reduced to the conditions that gave rise to the
present ones. For example, the positivistic approaches to myth
during the early twentieth century are characterized by an
historical determinism in which it was assumed that
indigenous and primitive cultures were expressing only a crude
scientism and etiology in their stories. Accordingly, one can
say that in general aesthetics cannot be free of temporality; it
must account for it.
But if not free, then cannot this relationship be productive?
What is the nature of interpretative claims? How can an
assertion of meaningfulness at once lie within the domain of
truth and yet be open to reinterpretation and dialogue? The
key lies in refiguring an understanding of the historical aporia.
My own argument lies in a affirmation of the analogous
relation between aesthetic perception and reason. But, unlike
the aesthetics that arose in the Enlightenment, I do not hold
reason within a de-ontological, worldless context. That is to
say, the reasonableness -- or what we denote in the notion of
objectivity -- of aesthetics as an interpretation of meaning lies
in the manner in which the historical flux that seems to
undermine all certainty can be understood productively, i.e.,
history as participating in reason as well. To be sure, the use
of the word 'reason' is a controversial one, insofar as it is often
seen as being grounded in the Enlightenment. But we must
bear in mind that I am referring to reason in an ontological
sense in which being and reason participate in one another.
This relation is impossible for the Enlightenment since, with
Descartes, existence itself was doubted. It is only after
Heidegger that we can once again begin to think being as
givenness and real presence and of reason as participating in
both human being and being itself. Thus, for Heidegger reason
is no longer constituted in and by the subject. We shall refer to
this in more detail below as it is fleshed out by the aporia of
history.
3. The Aporia and Openness of History
How is the historical situation open to meaning and not, in the
end, distortive of it? That is to say, how is history productive
and not reductive? The posing of these questions is already
bound within history. They themselves are provoked by
particular historical concerns that arise in reflection due to
philosophical necessity. To be sure, philosophical necessity is
also historical, and so it points to a curious dialectical
relationship between historical contexture and philosophical
exigency. As I will argue below, it is this dialectical relationship
that characterizes the openness of history and makes the
aporia of history productive and not futile.
The historical aporia, in which things are present with meaning
and yet this meaning is not fully disclosed, is by no means a
historical phenomenology, ultimately explainable by historical
causation. For if it was, the ability for us to perceive a
difference between the modes of being of things would not be
possible. Perception itself would be reducible to temporality, in
which case we could not stand outside of the temporal flux.
Phenomenologically speaking, the proof of our ability to stand
outside temporal flux is evinced by the fact of our raising the
question in the first place. But to look for a ground zero where
we can see such an ecstatic relation is impossible since we are
already and always outside (ecstatic) time. Heidegger refers to
this in terms of our sense of past ("having-been"), future and
present: "Temporality is the primordial 'outside of itself' in and
for itself. Thus we call the phenomena of future, having-been,
and present, the ecstasies of temporality. Temporality is not,
prior to this, a being that emerges from itself; its essence is
temporalizing in the unity of ecstasies."[20]
Heidegger's understanding of the ecstatic relationship to
temporality is centered on Dasein's "care." By our raising the
question of historicity, the question of the meaning of history
is possible, because human thinking naturally and by virtue of
being human is grounded in concern and intentionality. The
correlation between this phenomenological analysis and the
power of sight is by no means accidental. The power of sight,
for humans, is allied with the ability to understand. When we
say "I see," we mean, "I understand." To have a perception is
already to be involved in an understanding.[21] Heidegger
sees this in the manner in which we naturally look towards the
horizon of things. He writes, "The existential and temporal
condition of the possibility of the world lies in the fact that
temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a
horizon."[22] The horizon would not be perceptible without a
unity that human understanding perceives when trying to
make sense of things in general. The horizon in this way de-
limits the limitation of temporality.[23] That is to say, human
understanding affronts the historical situation characterized by
limitedness and transience. History is no longer a cause to
which we must reduce our understanding, but is the milieu
which we must account for in understanding the nature of
philosophical inquiry and dialogue.
Similarly, it is according to this Heideggerian thesis of
temporality that the notion of interpretive prejudice is made
productive. Unlike the Enlightenment, which conceived of an
objective beginning through rationality, modern hermeneutics
sees prejudice as the mark of one's openness to interpretative
meaning. Gadamer writes, "Prejudices are biases of our
openness to the world. They are simply the conditions
whereby we experience something-where by what we
encounter says something to us."[24] But what is
experienced? History?
No doubt there is a historical experience, as it were. But there
is something else that makes this historical experience
meaningful and that is being itself. Metaphysically, being is
first. That is to say, without being there is no possibility in
which any thing can have a historical presence.
Phenomenologically however, we cannot perceive the
primordiality of being prior to history, for they are co-
emergent. But rather than get caught in a situation of the
chicken versus the egg, we should recognize that the first
concern of thinking is being and not history. This is evident in
the question of selfhood and otherness that addresses the self
and the other ontologically first. The self and not history is
always the primary locus of philosophical reflection, for no
thought can emerge without the homelessness in being initially
perceived by the self about the self. It is not until later that
the conception of time and history become involved in a more
complex reflection on how understanding of either can be
articulated. Indeed, this truth is reflected in the history of
philosophy itself, beginning with the Greek concern for being
over temporality[25] and continuing into more recent claims to
self-awareness in the postmodern appeal to historicity.
But this concern for being by no means displaces the
significance of history. Indeed, it is history that aggravates the
question of the meaning of being. That is to say, it introduces
the problem of multiple interpretation and finitude. Time is
always passing; one's hermeneutical relationship to an object
of art is always changing, like Heraclitus' river. So we are left
then with the problem of mediating between two poles: the
first concern of the meaning of being which gives to human
understanding the very means of stepping outside the
reduction of history and the aporia of history that would seem
to defeat any definitive meaning of being by introducing
finitude and multiplicity. How to navigate between the two?
4. The Temporal Key
In this section I suggest that the central problem concerning
the understanding of historicity in a productive way has to do
with the understanding of temporality. That is to say, we tend
to speak of temporality and history as if they are two
unrelated phenomena. Temporality is a phenomenological
question, while history is a more accessible fact of human
existence. We all know history in the sense of past events and
encountering artifacts of the past; we know history by the
limitations placed upon the present view, that history is a
puzzle that we attempt to solve. But we do not necessarily
know temporality except as a passing away, and we do not
think temporality and history together insofar as the events
inscribed in history, as a story, outrun the fleeting sense of
time as passing away. History, in its fixation in texts, artifacts
and cultural memory outlasts the sense of passing and is
instilled more with a sense of mystery where what is lost is
somehow still present.
In history, the past endures; in temporality, all is fleeting.
Indeed, implied in a sense of history is also a sense of
judgment, that is, from critical to moral-e.g., questions of
taste and questions of moral correctness. Interestingly, if
history is involved in aesthetic interpretation, it is precisely
here that Ricoeur sees it as moving beyond the aims of
phenomenology.[26] Is there some correlation between the
fixation of history in writing and cultural memory and aesthetic
judgment? A radical historicism would say "no" since the
correlation itself is subject to the reduction of historical
conditions. Perhaps, then, the way out of the historical mire
lies in returning to the phenomenological dimension of history
- i.e., temporality. Through this approach we can separate the
judgmental aspect of historical understanding that often
becomes the target of radical historicism from its assertion
that judgments are value-laden with historical prejudices.
One can say that despite the fixation inherent in historical
discourse, the event of discovery and meditation upon past
events itself participates within the context of history. This, as
we have observed, is the basis of the historical reduction of
human understanding: no one stands outside history. But
concealed in this is a far more significant phenomenon that
goes to the heart of the historical reduction. That is to say, the
force of the argument that no one stands outside history
gathers its momentum because it recognizes that the point
from which one interprets history is itself a passing away
subject to hermeneutical circumstances.(This is ok.) Any point
of interpretation loses its claim to objectivity and validity by
the very fact that it, too, is situated in a non-omniscient, non-
objective milieu of being, that is, a being-in-the-world that is
always passing away.
But why is this not initially confronted as a problem in our
understanding of history? Why is it that a historical
understanding always strives towards meaning and not
contextual qualification? In the same way that history outlasts
temporality and the loss of events through its inscription, I
should say that it is the interpreter's situatedness in a
meaningful culture and tradition that allows him or her to gain
a foothold within the continuously moving narrative of
humankind. Ricoeur observes that the otherness of history is
precisely that which provokes the interpreter's identification
with it. Otherness is not the sign of an ontological distance but
a hermeneutical relation: "Otherness is radicalized to a degree
when difference is no longer seen as the variable of an
invariant . . . but as escaping from any kind of subjection to
models. . .."[27] Thus, the point from which one interprets
history appears to be secured, situated and grounded in a
meaningful relation to history itself that is not open to folly or
deception. This sense of certainty and urgency is characterized
by a sense of philosophical necessity. Kant would have never
been so sure of the need of his three critiques (i.e., "What can
I know?", "What ought I do?", and "What may I hope?")
unless the age in which he wrote did not in some way demand
it.
The philosophical necessity of the Enlightenment is indeed one
which is characterized above all by the need to discover and
create new approaches to a seemingly newly revealed universe
(i.e., one without inherent meaning or teleology).[28] In this
sense, it is not so much that Enlightenment philosophy,
characterized by its rational approach, assumed that reason is
the saving power, but, more accurately, that the
Enlightenment saw their its philosophical necessity as one in
which a path and common ground needed to be secured in
face of the new post-Galilean universe. The general notion of
common sense then became not only the center upon which
existence could be secured, but also was transformed into an
elaborate epistemology contradicting the very commonness of
its appeal.[29] Reason was at once the highest and least
accessible power.
Thus one can say that both the passing away of time that
undermines historical certainty and the philosophical necessity
that one takes as stemming from and disclosing a meaningful
interpretation of history, despite being in history, are both
genuine poles within the historical relationship and do not
extinguish one another. Their interrelation is not one of
combativeness but of dialectic. To see this more clearly, let us
follow through with our argument concerning temporality. In
this proposal I attempt to follow Heidegger's understanding of
temporality. He writes:
The temporal is what must pass away. This
passing away is conceived more precisely as the
successive flowing away of the "now" out of the
"not yet now" into the "no longer now." Time
causes the passing away itself; yet it itself can
pass away only if it persists throughout all the
passing away. Time persists, consists in passing.
It is, in that it constantly is not. This is the
representational idea of time that characterizes
the concept of "time" which is standard
throughout the metaphysics of the West.[30]
Time is that which we only know by its passing away. And so
time eludes us in our attempt to isolate it, for we cannot
isolate the point in a sequence of "nows" and say that this
point is time. While this alludes to the paradox of
understanding time which is perhaps most well-known from
Augustine's Confessions (Bk XI), Heidegger is also stating
something very subtle, for he concludes: "This is the
representational idea that characterizes the concept of "time"
which is standard throughout the metaphysics of the West."
This statement suggests that the understanding of time is
itself a product of the engagement with being, in being. In this
case, time is understood as a "representational idea" that is
moreover supported and given credence by "the metaphysics
of the West." What is at stake here in this statement? Is
Heidegger asserting that time is simply a construct of the
human mind that can never be accessed, an a priori in human
reflection?
Inaccessibility is a Kantian feature and not a Heideggerian
one.[31] We can observe that even in the metaphysics of the
West, of which Heidegger is critical,[32] there still lies a
glimmer of the true thinking that he sees originating with the
ancient Greeks, such as Heraclitus, Parmenides and
Anaximander. Insofar as time is concerned, what remains a
glimmer of true thinking in the metaphysics of the West is that
its understanding of time mirrors, or is the correlate of, its
understanding of being. That is to say, because being and
thinking no longer coincide for Western metaphysics, the
immediacy of time as temporality can no longer coincide.
Being is no longer the first thought, as Aquinas once said;
rather, doubt of being is the first thought. Modern philosophy
is always seeking the source of being elsewhere, behind the
appearance.[33] Directly related to this, the understanding of
time becomes a conceptual concern. What is the concept of
time? This question is asked scientifically, as if we can arrive
at an absolute determination of time itself. But according to its
nature of passing away, time is precisely the one concept that
we cannot know except by virtue of its fleeting nature. Does
this suggest a vain relation to time or that time is the ultimate
relativity?
In proposing these ambitious questions, let us draw back from
the boundaries of metaphysics. I wish to make a modest
observation: Because being is non-coincidental with time in the
modern understanding, an understanding of time loses its
contexture. That is to say, with this coincidence removed there
is a formidable obstacle that hinders us from adequately
reflecting upon the nature of passing away. The dislocation
between temporality and being removes the ground upon
which time can take shape, that is, take shape in being.
Because being is that which is no longer taken to be given and
because existence is doubted, time floats away and we seek its
nature philosophically as if it could have significance apart
from being.[34] This observation should not be astonishing. If
the primacy and givenness of being are doubted and being is
that which "reveals itself only through time,"[35] then how
can time be understood essentially, for it has no being to
which it can be related?
Rather than undertaking a metaphysical discussion of time, I
wish to point to the fact that we can glimpse the nature of
time by seeing it phenomenologically as constituting the
horizon of being in its passing away. Temporality is then the
passing away by which being is. This is evident in our
understanding of the horizon of time itself towards which
temporality moves. The key term is 'horizon,' for it suggests at
once a meaningful relationship to being in temporality and a
constantly moving milieu in which no thing or view can
possess truth.[36] It is this fragile quality of being that I
believe provides the ground upon which the historical
reduction can be confronted. I say " 'confronted ' and not
'surmounted' because the condition of being in temporality is
one that can never be overcome. And the inability of
overcoming does not suggest an essential lack of our being;
rather it points to the exigency of human being to always be
engaged and aware of its relationship to the temporal horizon.
It is this constant, participatory nature of human
understanding that I shall refer to as 'fragility.' We must now
see how this horizon bears upon aesthetic interpretation.
5. Philosophical Necessity and Historical Necessity
Let us restate the historical nature of aesthetics: It is an
engagement with the past insofar as a work of art is an
artifact of history. The horizonal nature of temporality
suggests that historical understanding in some way has this
same horizon; that is to say, history, in looking at the past,
looks towards the future. This is true in the sense that
generally an understanding of the past is undertaken in order
to understand the present and where the present may lead.
Yet, more significantly, we should observe that this
understanding that aims to take into account of the past and
the future is also a reshaping of the past and the future. This
places a unique onus on human being.
The fragile relationship of human understanding is at the
center of historical necessity. That is to say, our present
concerns are the impetus for looking at historical artifacts
themselves (myths, art, instruments, texts) in order to learn
from the past so as not to repeat it; to gain a new
understanding through the rebirth of sources to renew a
tradition in order to give shape to the future; and to learn of
past rituals and myths in order to show the narrowness of our
own (what Ricoeur refers to as the peripeteia of logos).
Indeed, to understand history so as not to repeat it is possible
not because the historical events are those that repeat, but
because we recognize that despite the change in history, there
is a similar historical necessity that must be addressed. Insofar
as this necessity repeats, we are asked to change what is
happening. This impetus to change not only affects the
present and future, but is itself a change of the past; we
interpret the past differently in order to learn from it. This, in
turn, suggests that the objectivity of the historical past is only
in the events that have occurred ; how we understand it is
always involved in an interpretation. And, as we know, there is
no objective interpretation. A disinterested interpretation is,
therefore, one that is not authentically objective but fails to
fully commit to the significance of historical
understanding.[37] Thus, historical understanding is not only a
discovery but a translation that changes history itself. The
fragile relationship is therefore a very potent one-and here is
where the postmodern concern is most persuasive, for it seeks
to keep in check any rational dominance that would try to
assert a meta-narrative of history itself. The fragile
relationship is the hermeneutical locus point from which the
past is refigured and the future is prefigured. Dupré observes:
"Any interpretation of the past aims at
understanding the present. Yet in the process of
doing so it affects the future as well and thereby
the very development of the real itself. Those
who in a particular epoch impose a new pattern
of meaning on the life and thought of their time
do more than apply a different film of thought to
an indifferent reality. They transform the nature
of reality itself. If the preceding carries any
metaphysical weight, it would be contained in the
unoriginal thesis that Being must not be
conceived as a substance unmoved by
thought."[38]
Dupré points towards a complex involvement in history that
has immense implications. According to Dupré, we can say
that the fragile relationship is characterized by a mediation
between the philosophical necessity we explored in the
previous section and the historical necessity specific to the
moment in which one attempts an interpretation. Thus, the
interpreter is always engaged on these two fronts where he or
she is addressed by a philosophical necessity according to the
historical conditions of the present age, while at the same time
engaging with the artifact of the past that is also addressed to
the philosophical necessity uniquely figured according to the
historical concerns of its time. Furthermore, the interpreter is
not excused from the future to which reflection is bound to
give shape. The dialectic of philosophical and historical
necessity constitutes the dynamics of responsibility of aesthetic
interpretation that we shall develop in more detail in the last
section.
An example of this kind of engagement in interpretation is a
somewhat misleading request insofar as we are naturally and
already involved in this relationship to historical and
philosophical necessity. Yet precisely because it is natural and
characterized by alreadiness, this involvement can go
unrecognized. I believe the hermeneutical works of Louis
Dupré (Passage to Modernity and The Enlightenment) are
some of the most exemplary of recent studies that account for
a historical acknowledgment of conditions and concerns in
relation to the needs of the current philosophical epoch.
Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue also takes this approach in
his consideration of the broken discourse inherited by moral
philosophy that has gone unnoticed. At one point he even
states that as a result of our uncritical inheritance of the
Enlightenment metaphysics, "It is no wonder that the teaching
of ethics is so often destructive and skeptical in its effects upon
the minds of those taught."[39] MacIntyrerefers to an
example that we can use by way of analogy. In the section
where he looks at taboo in pre-modern cultures (Chapter 9:
Nietzsche or Aristotle?), he notes that part of the reason why
taboos are something that lose their intelligibility over the
years is because their original context dissolves, and thus so
too do the rules that give reason and credence to them.
MacIntyre writes in elaboration of this point:
"In such a situation the rules have been deprived
of any status that can secure their authority and,
if they do not acquire some new status quickly,
both their interpretation and their justification
become debatable. When the resources of a
culture are too meager to carry through the task
of reinterpretation, the task of justification
becomes impossible."[40]
The analogous significance of the taboo example lies in the
loss of the memory of the original context, which itself is
something natural to history's temporal quality-the passing
away of time. While history outlasts any one person, it exists
only insofar as there are people who exist. Thus, historical
memory is based on transmission and is therefore indeed
fragile and incomplete; that which we can see as running
parallel to a culture's resources in MacIntyre's example.
Resources involve memory, myth, institutions as collective
memory and so on. The point is that while this need of
historical memory is in some sense a lack, it is natural to
existence and so therefore is also a productive impetus. The
insufficiency of historical memory is the very catalyst by which
things need to be recalled. Furthermore, this recollection is not
a mere recovery of facts but is a reflection in order to
understand the past. So the historical conditions are those
that cannot and should not be dismissed in an interpretative
philosophy. I should say in this sense that historical
situatedness is the power that drives us into reflection, in just
the same way as we arrive in medias res in a Shakespeare
play in order to understand what is taking place, what is at
stake and what levels of perception and understanding are
driving the play to its lawful end as a tragedy or comedy.
This is why philosophical reflection is characterized by the
presence of hope, that is, the hope that one is within truth so
that the shape given to the future by thought is no betrayal or
peril. It realizes that it cannot claim to possess the truth since
it cannot predict what effects its thoughts may provoke.[41]
One can say that the act of interpretation is the intricate and
fragile involvement in a dialogue between past and future
interlocutors made contemporaneous in the present moment of
reflection. But if this is so, then what power and responsibility
do interpretative claims have on history, on being?
This complex affair is what properly marks the domain of
aesthetic communication. It makes a judgment in the
understanding of the artifact in order to have meaningful
bearing on the present and towards the future only through a
reshaping of the past.
6. Aisthēsis: Commitment and Communication
Understood as pure receptivity, the Greek aisthēsis also
expresses the possibility of pure communication:
communication between what and/or who? In view of the
preceding analysis, I want to say there is a double
communication between philosophical and historical necessity
inscribed in the moment (the present) in which the interpreter
engages with the artifact and the philosophical and historical
necessity in which the artifact exists (the past). It is important
to note that philosophical and historical necessity are never
realms or epochs that can in themselves be secured, as they
are always subject to the passing away and flow of time in
which the interpreter comes to them. Does this simply not
repeat the viciousness of historical reductionism only more
elaborately?
No, because the emergence of communication in the aesthetic
moment is one which stakes an interpretation of the artifact in
order to engage with the possibility of being itself-i.e., the
ontological potential of the meaning of being. The commitment
of interpretation is that it should mean something; this is its
wager that it has something to say, to disclose. It in no way
can be final as if it provided a lasting hold on truth. Yet this is
not to say that it is relative and soon to be surpassed. The
involvement of interpretation in historicity assures that its
claim is subject to the conditions under the horizon of time,
that is, for lack of a better description, that its truth is only
activated within the our conscious involvement in the dialectic
of the double communication. It is this self-reflexive
participation in history which constitutes the openness of
human understanding, whereas Heidegger would say of
language as such that it lies before itself as the letting lie
before of being.[42]
If this hermeneutical attitude is plausible, then aesthetics
rightly denotes the difference between a natural scientific
attachment to objectivity and a human scientific concern for
commitment (to being) and communication (to one another
throughout history). This manner of aesthetic engagement is
itself a manner of reflection concerned with the question of the
meaning of being from an expressly human scientific approach,
as opposed to a natural or physical scientific approach. Thus,
the validity of an interpretation in aesthetics is not in its
validity according to proof and objectivity. Rather, it stakes its
claim on how the dialogue with civilization-past, present, and
future-is opened, maintained and always engaged with.
"Historical understanding," writes Ricoeur, "does not have any
meaning proper to itself. On the contrary, it acquires meaning
when it becomes the motivating principle of philosophical
searching which is actually ventured and engaged in."[43]
If, as Ricoeur states, history has no meaning proper to itself,
we can say that history is another mode of disclosure of the
meaningfulness that, in fact, informs it. That is to say, if
philosophy asks the question of the meaning of being, it is this
meaning that informs the historical unfolding, and in turn, this
unfolding takes shape according to the specific and unique
historical dispositions of an age and how they ask the question
of the meaning of being. And thus, while philosophy aims at
Truth, it is in history that Truth becomes meaningful. This
surely is the crux of meaning in Heidegger's observation that
being is only disclosed through time. And therefore, this
double communication can be the only measure by which
interpretation can be productively critiqued. The temporal
nature of understanding brings back continuously the onus of
having to remain in a mode of reflection where we
acknowledge the philosophical necessity in terms of how it has
emerged according to its historical specificity, not only with
regard to the artifact and its age, but also self-reflectively in
our own situation with its own distinct prejudices. This double
communication therefore constitutes the genuine moment of
aesthetic judgment. Ricoeur writes on communication:
. . . on the road that ascends from my situation
toward the truth, there is only one way of moving
beyond myself, and this is communication. I have
only one means of emerging from myself: I must
be able to live within another. Communication is
a structure of true knowledge. . . . The history of
philosophy is a philosophical work with multiple
detours all heading toward self-clarification. . . .
self-clarification, even if this clarification is never
finally achieved but always further unfolding,
driving history forward . . .. We have to bear in
mind after all, that the nature of being is that it
is in a state of becoming in time.[44]
It is clear from this analysis that there is no clean formula or
method one can follow in aesthetic judgment. It can never
clear the ground in order to stake its claim since the ground is
involved in history, always passing and never allowing
omniscience. This places the importance of human thinking on
its dialogical nature and not, as modern thinking often tends,
its axiomatic structuring. Thus, the notion of the double
communication involved in historical and philosophical
necessity of the artifact and the historical and philosophical
necessity of the aesthete is not offered as a methodology but
as a preparation that can never be surpassed.
Perhaps this process seems monotonous since it cannot have a
terminus because it is an activity that occurs in being. But if
we are to take aesthetics according to its original Greek
historical necessity, we get a glimpse of the depth of meaning
in the Aristotelian understanding that bios theoretikos is the
highest form of doing. History itself is not the ground of
meaningfulness; being is. History, by virtue of its aporia,
ensures that this ontological meaningfulness constantly
remains the mystery that, according to the Socratic
observation on wisdom, provokes our wonder. Or perhaps,
according to our own philosophical and historical necessity, we
may prefer a less grand manner of speaking:
Our refiguration of history through reflection is the only means
by which we can avoid the risk of being reduced to it. In this,
history is not lost or distorted, but comes into its own as the
story of human being, reflectively and constantly retold by
human being. It follows that history is not a dead past but the
advent of meaning, that is, a meaning that must come
through it.
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